Making Sense of Where We Are in the Real Estate Industry

The U.S. is going through a time of unprecedented change as it pertains to the economy, politics, and the way we do business. Nowhere is this more relevant than in the banking and real estate industries. Decimated real estate values have changed the value of many domestic banks, which in turn, has determined their ability to lend into an improving economy. It is my intent with the Current Cycle that I share with you what new and emerging issues I see. I hope you will share yours with me.

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Fantasy Pro Formas: A Quick Return to the Past


FANTASY PRO FORMAS: A QUICK RETURN TO THE PAST
“Though difficult to measure in a limited transaction environment, commercial real estate valuations have clearly returned to more rational relationships with property-level fundamentals.  However, the deleveraging cycle and structural headwinds will result in a slow recovery with pockets of volatility to be expected.  Extreme discipline is assessing both the asset level and macroeconomic risk will be critical to making the right investment decisions”.
PIMCO, June 2010

More than a year later, PIMCO’s read on the future of the market had mixed results.  True, pockets of volatility have emerged, and yes, investors are well advised to exercise extreme discipline with investment decisions, but have valuations really returned to rational relationships with property fundamentals?

Anecdotes from the Market
Recently I have had a common conversation with clients and colleagues who are losing bids to buy commercial real estate assets.  In every circumstance they speak about the winner pushing perceived value by loading up the pro forma with fantastical assumptions about the future.  These reports seemed to be supported by recent news articles referring to investor’s perceived relative safety of commercial real estate versus stocks and bonds, and the higher risk-adjusted current yields real estate offers. S & P has picked up on this trend in its CMBS market review.  S & P reported that appraisals for new CMBS loans appear to be building in upside rents and occupancy to arrive at a value instead of using in-place rents and tenancy at closing.  Let’s look at some of the important factors behind the pro forma:

NOI Growth & Cap Rate Compression
Rapid pro forma NOI growth should be a primary concern.  In most property markets, NOI growth would be based on net absorption of available space, back below local market long-term averages, to support rent rates and force tenants to compete for superior space.  However, net absorption is driven by job growth, diluted by increasing efficiency in the use of employee space, and consumer sentiment.  Although the U.S. has experienced some job growth (some estimates peg the figure of 1.25 million jobs, of the 8 million lost, have returned) it is weak and not consistent across all property markets.  Only in very select markets can we reasonably assume any measurable acceleration of job growth and the resulting net absorption of vacant space.  Thus, identifying and quantifying potential job creators is critically important to justify aggressive occupancy and rental rate assumptions.

Quality of Income
The Great Recession created winners and losers with American businesses.  For tenants who still remain, creditworthiness is widely divergent.  Correspondingly, we are well served to avoid assessing the likelihood of collecting contract rent from tenants uniformly across the roster.  Tenants having signed leases in 2006-07, the peak of rental rates for all product types, are even more of a concern.  Tenants with above average credit quality should be underwritten with care when their contract rent is 20-35% above current market rates, and plenty of alternative spaces in the sub-market beckoning them.  W.P. Carey School of Business’ Mark Stapp recently told GlobeSt.com, “One mistake people make is to treat all tenants in an office building as having the same risk profile.  The borrower then applies the same discount rate to everybody by discounting the net operating income.”  Apparently the CMBS market has already picked up on this theme.  A Barclays Capital strategist, Julia Tcherkassova, recently commented on the rating agencies now being quick to check exposure to any recently downgraded tenant and adjusting their ratings on existing issues accordingly. 

Return Expectations Cap Rates, and Discount Rates
Once investors are convinced of the positive forward looking NOI trends, it’s not a long leap to then push down cap rates in their DCF models.  Main stream investment theory says that it’s typically during these periods of presumed NOI growth that investor’s expectations drive cap rates down causing current returns to fall and asset values to grow.  Currently, the most often cited justification for lower cap rates I’ve heard relate to the all-time low interest rates driving down investor expectations on current returns, which investors hope to compensate for with an effective option on the assets future upside value.  At this point the potential for problems has been compounded: higher assumed NOI figures and terminal value, discounted back to present value at a lower rate.

REC’s CREDDVal Module
REC’s Commercial Real Estate Due Diligence and Valuation (CREDDVal) module is a fully automated discounted cash flow tool which has been internally developed in response to these and other growing valuation concerns. The DCF is fashioned after the Real-Time Valuation models where the discount rate constructed from the combination of the term structure of interest rates and individual tenant credit assessments.  These two components comprise the effective discount rate, and differentiate properties based on the tenant rent roll and the projected path of the risk free rate and the local real estate premium.  CREDDVal allows an investor to test hundreds of differing scenarios about the future and how they impact the expected investment returns.  Furthermore, CREDDVal differentiates similar assets by:
  • ·    Assessing income quality by quantifying the differences between contract and market rents over the investment horizon.  By looking at this metric in the context of market vacancy we can truly assess the riskiness of the revenue projection.
  • ·         Analyzing individual leases and quantifying the impact of FSGBYES, NNN, and Gross lease structures, all contained within the same property.
  • ·         Valuing income from a lower credit tenant differently from the income expected to be received by a higher credit tenant.
  • ·         Quantifying the impact of lease rollovers on operating cash flow and the property’s ability to meet DSCR and LTV covenants.
  • ·         Identifying future risk management areas, and demanding answers to questions relating to adequate return for assumed risk.


Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Rapid Due Diligence and Valuation of Loan Potfolios

Large loan portfolio sales have moved in the direction of widely marketed public bids, where the time to review the offered portfolio is short and the cost to perform due diligence is high. Thus, valuation consultants assisting with bid pricing must be in a position to deliver a rapid portfolio review and valuation that the investor/client can rely on. Four critical issues are:

Standardized Data Capture
Investors may be faced with getting their arms around the value of as many as 200 real estate loans when preparing for a bid. If the portfolio is widely marketed, not much time will be allowed. In order for the client to submit a worthwhile bid, the underwriting and due diligence process must be precise with information regarding each loan gathered in a uniform fashion. That information gathering device, or template, should be constructed in a collaborative way between the client and the valuation firm prior to the loan file review, be reflective of the scope of work, and be based on a format that addresses the client’s investment style and conforms with their portfolio roll-up valuation model. Although basic principles always apply to data gathering templates, it will likely change with each mandate.

Strong Market Analytics
An important part of any loan file review is the aggregation of accurate and timely information regarding the property market and comparable properties proximate to the collateral. Subscription based information systems are a must, but even more important are telephone calls made to multiple local market participants. Investment brokers, appraisers, asset managers, property managers and ex, reformed real estate developers should be accessed for market color and applicable information. So much of the loan valuation entails anecdotal evidence of the market trend with regards to cap rates, rent concessions and lease structures, and how investors are choosing to look at potential investment opportunities. Conversations should be noted in the valuation template, and the information gleaned should be used responsibly in the valuation process. Good information is gained by knowing the right questions to ask, and being persistent in finding well-informed locals willing to share information with you.

Operating Statement Analysis
The nuts and bolts of the asset valuation process begins with an analytical cleansing of both sides of the historical operating statements provided by the borrower. In a best case scenario the analyst is able to review the past three years of prior operating history, and perhaps a YTD, or TTM operating statement. Whatever time frame is available, it’s almost certain that the analyst will have some work to do to make sure the operating statement accurately reflects the property’s true economic potential. On the revenue side particular care needs to be given to over-market contract base rents. Whether the over-market rate is a result of over-market TI amortization, or the vintage of lease execution, rents should be marked to market to give a true long-term perspective of the revenue generating ability of the property. For retail properties, do occupancy costs exceed a maximum percentage of store sales? Also, expense reimbursements and other income coming from properties whose occupancies exceed the market rate should be studied. If the superior occupancy rate at the subject can’t be justified these revenue streams are illusory. On the expense side, the analyst must be concerned with owner’s expenses buried inside property operations, one-time extraordinary operating expenses, and capital items that should be considered outside the operating statement. Concluding an operating statement that fairly reflects the economic potential of the property is a combination of art and science. The ultimate underwritten NOI should be debated and considered from many angles.

Logical Path of Resolution
After having spent a day or more collecting data on one loan file and trying to make sense of it, the analyst should be in a position to share with the client what he thinks will be the likely path of loan resolution. Nobody should know the loan file and property as well as the analyst assigned the loan. Three opinions need to be delivered: the time until a resolution event occurs, the type of resolution event, and the cost of such resolution. The client may have his own ideas and may even discard the opinion offered. Nevertheless, the analyst needs to formulate ideas regarding these three considerations while developing estimates of value for the collateral, and then being prepared to deliver it on the roll-up call.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Real-Time Valuation DCF


Traditionally, real estate investors have performed discounted cash flow analysis by assuming operating income projections and a terminal value, and then discounting all cash flows back to a present value.  The answer to which discount rate to use was often answered by using the risk free rate and then adding a risk premium representative of “real estate” type risk.   Thus, a single discount rate was used regardless of how distant in the future the flows occurred and how weak or strong the property’s tenants were relative to the “typical” tenant credit profile.

So if the acquisition game is about culling out the nuanced differences between seemingly similar assets (at least on the surface), why would a valuation methodology treat cash flows, differing in timing as well as quality, in the same fashion?  Doesn’t make any sense and may lead to missed opportunities or unfulfilled expectations.

A “Real-Time Valuation” (RTV) model , Young (2006), can be a superior approach to differentiating cash flows from multiple assets competing for your capital.  The basic idea behind RTV is to incorporate the term structure of interest rates, as expressed by the Treasury yield curve, as the risk free rate, and then adding a tenant risk premium for each tenant on the rent roll.  A rating system of A through E is developed and specific rates are assigned to each rating category.  The ratings and the rates are based upon the analyst’s intuitive feel of the tenant risk profile compared to the general tenant market.  The blended, overall tenant risk rating is then added to an interpolated monthly Treasury yield, and together they serve as the monthly discount rate.  Although Young suggests to account for rollover leases into perpetuity to obtain the value of future leases, I suggest building in assumptions about the re-leasing and lease up of vacant space, and terminal value, then discounting those cash flows at the monthly rate and value at the developed discount rate at the time of the projected sale.

Although valuation is the primary focus of RTV, yield measures, explicit risk measurement and assessment, lease and property duration, and elasticities or sensitivities with respect to changes in either market rent or discount rate are additional benefits that come from the model and pointed out by Young.  The implications for real estate investors are that the RTV model allows measurement of significant differences in the risk and performance characteristics of individual properties not seen in conventional analytical techniques.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Using “Marked-to-Model” to Value Illiquid Land Assets


I just finished another review of a large portfolio of CRE loans offered for sale by a US domestic bank.  In the portfolio were a handful of loans collateralized by undeveloped land assets in moribund property markets.  As with all portfolio reviews the main objective was to assign a value to each and every piece of collateral so that the value of the debt position could be determined.  The work could be described as marking assets to market.  Mark-to-market is valuing an asset at a price it could be sold for within a reasonable marketing time.  However, mark-to-market is problematic when: a) there is no trend line from which we can project future sales to follow, b) the markets are illiquid, and c) the market is in crisis mode.  Unfortunately, many property markets continue to demonstrate all three traits – at least for land. 

An alternative to mark-to-market is “mark-to-model”.  The term refers to the pricing of an asset based on a financial model rather than allowing the market, a sale transaction, to determine the price.  The term mark-to-model is typically used in the world of complex securities and debt instruments, but it has its application in real estate too.  In real estate terms, a development pro forma is assembled that allows for the determination of a residual land value, based on several input variables from both the property and capital markets. 

Although mark-to-model is less reliable than a mark-to-market, because of the uncertainty of assumptions about the future being realized, the approach is vastly superior to the approach we see so often of simply discounting the 2007 appraised value by 35% to 75%.

For illiquid land assets the mark-to-model process begins with an assessment of the land’s highest and best use – or what can be developed and how much of it can be built.  An assessment of entitlement and construction costs are gathered from local market participants, as are estimates of operating revenues and operating expenses.  Next, the capital markets are surveyed to determine the necessary development yield on cost threshold.  Once all of these components are in-place, a residual land value is then solved for.  An assessment of when market demand will dictate new development is made, and the residual land value is discounted back from that date to determine a final mark-to-model land value.  Discount rates ranging from 15% to 25% are reflective of risks associated with land assets.

Mark-to-model is never perfect, but does provide the analyst an opportunity to express what is observable in the market and relate land value to those known metrics.

Monday, June 28, 2010

Bank Exposure to Real Estate and It’s Impact on Regulatory Capital Levels

See the full article at http://www.recounsel.net/


In a July 7th, 2010 Wall Street Journal article the author points out: “A big push by banks in recent months to modify loans – by stretching out maturities or allowing below market interest rates – has slowed a spike in defaults. It has also helped preserve banks’ capital, by keeping some dicey loans classified as “performing” and thus minimizing the amount of cash banks must set aside in reserve for future losses.”

In my recent efforts to acquire real estate assets from banks, I have encountered a few common and recurring themes. First, each bank had a substantial number of loans more favorably classified than the circumstances warranted. Just as the WSJ article referred to, many “performing” loans were only performing because the loan was recently restructured and an update of the 2006-07 appraisal, supporting the original loan, was avoided. Second, the bank’s carrying values for the individual real estate mortgages were always in excess of what they could be monetized for today - sometimes by a wide margin – 30-40% more than FMV. No matter what your exit strategy, a reasonable investor could/would never purchase the asset at the bank’s carrying value. Third, not one of the banks I have worked with could have consummated any transaction that involved a significant portion of their loan portfolio since the collective discounts on carrying value to reach fair market value would have added up to more than the remaining capital on its financial statements.

Does the banking industry as a whole demonstrate adequate capital on it’s collective balance sheet to be able to absorb inevitable future losses in its real estate assets. Because without adequate capital and liquidity, banks can’t make the new loans necessary for businesses to hire additional workers. “This is especially relevant regarding small businesses who have accounted for roughly 45% of all job losses during the recent recession. Small businesses also have been responsible for about one-third of all jobs created growth during the last two economic expansions”.

Given the strong correlation between job growth and real estate space absorption, without job growth, a real estate value rebound is only a pipe dream. In order for real estate values to gain back some of the 40% decline since the 2007 peak, the industry first needs to experience several quarters of positive net space absorption, which ultimately drives rental rates higher and cap rates lower, through capital flows wanting to ride the momentum up.

Moody’s Investor Services estimates the peak in real estate asset values was reached in October 2007, and since then prices have fallen 43.7%. The decline has been largely driven by declining cash flows that have resulted from increased vacancy rates and decreased rental income. A multiplier effect has come from rising cap rates.

The greatest amount of loan losses will be concentrated in loans originated very late in the cycle, 2006 – 2007. During this timeframe loan underwriters became progressively more aggressive to win business from an over-abundance of competing lenders, and were basing their tighter ratios and spreads on ever-increasing collateral values. Furthermore, deteriorating property values were so significant in this cycle that even loans made early in the cycle and at reasonable loan to value ratios (65-75%) are potentially going underwater.

As bad as the deteriorating values have been for commercial real estate, the impact on raw, undeveloped land have been many multiples worse. As with the commercial real estate asset class, raw land value deteriorations have varied by region, with the coastal regions faring far better than others. I have personally witnessed raw land value declines from 50% to 85% of their peak values, with little prospect for regaining that lost value any time soon, in many non-coastal markets.

So what does this significant drop in real estate values mean for the banking industry and for the greater economy? More specifically, I am concerned with what it means for the more than 7,000 small to mid-sized banks that show heavy concentrations of real estate assets, but also represent America’s small business lending machine.

Capital Adequacy for Banks Holding $100 Million to $10 Billion in Assets. First, it’s important to note that bank exposure to real estate is not evenly spread among all banks. Banks with assets between $100 Million and $10 Billion – small to mid-sized banks have a far greater exposure to real estate, expressed as a ratio of their capital, and are less well capitalized against the risks of substantial commercial real estate loan write-downs. This group represents well over 7,000 banks and is clearly the weak spot within the banking industry.

These small to mid-sized banks also represent the bulk of small business lending (estimates are around 40% of all small business lending), and any type of systemic failure of the group could cause some significant capital constraints to small businesses needing capital to grow and hire workers.

The withdrawal of small business lending creates a negative feedback loop that suppresses economic recovery as fewer loans to small businesses hamper employment growth, which could prolong commercial real estate problems by contributing to higher vacancy rates and lower cash flows. There is a considerable impact on the overall economy here. Small businesses have accounted for around 45% of net job losses in the current recession and have contributed to around 1/3 of net job growth in the past two economic expansions.

Troubled loans have a significant negative effect on the capital of the banks that hold them; the two operate jointly. A bank’s capital strength is generally measured as the ratio of specified capital elements on the firm’s consolidated balance sheet (e.g., the amount of paid-in capital and retained earnings) to its total assets. Decreases in the value of assets on a bank’s balance sheet change the ratio by requiring that amounts be withdrawn from capital to make up for the losses. Losses in asset value that are carried directly to an institution’s capital accounts without being treated as items of income or loss have the same effect.

As of March 31st, 2010 banks ranging in size from $100 million to $10 billion in assets reported strong capital levels, and gave a very healthy appearance to this sector of the banking industry. However, keep in mind that these stated capital amounts are based on the banks’ methodology for valuing their assets. Any overstatement of the value of their assets is an overstatement of their capital.

In order to assess capital adequacy we must apply an assumption of future losses for each asset bucket and compare those fair values to book values. Positive differences add to banks capital and negative differences detract from capital.

In order to perform a more precise estimate of the difference between fair value and book value, I have begun with 3/31/10 Call Report data for bank real estate assets and applied my own experiential loss estimates for each specific bucket of assets. Asset amounts are stated in current book value terms. I have added back all net charge offs from January 2008 through March, 2010 (adjusted for asset sales), as well as current loss allowances currently posted (ALLL). This sum gives an approximation of the original principal balance at the time the loan was issued. Since bank loans are usually short-term, any amortization would be negligible. I have then made my estimate of the total write down from original principal balance, as it correlates with the deteriorating value of the real estate collateral. That figure represents my Fair Market Value of the asset, which is compared to the current carried Book Value, and the difference is assessed. That calculated difference represents necessary asset write downs to get to fair value. Any write-downs represent an overstatement of capital on the books of these banking institutions. I used the following loss assumptions for each asset bucket:

Construction and Land Development Loans: 20% total loss

Commercial Real Estate Loans: 15% total loss

Multi-Family Residential Loans: 8% total loss

1-4 Family Residential Loans: 20% total loss

Farm Land Mortgages: 15% total loss

Commercial and Industrial Loans: 20% total loss

Summary of Write Downs and Restated Capital. Through the use of my total portfolio loss estimates for each individual asset bucket, I have estimated a total overstatement of real estate value, held by banks with $100 million to $10 billion in assets, to be approximately $196 billion. As I stated earlier, any reduction in asset carrying value will cause a reduction in banks regulatory capital. Deducting my value overstatement of real estate assets from banks stated capital levels nearly wipes out such capital. A current marking of assets to market means that banks hold capital just a tick more than 1% of its assets. This is a precarious position for banks and portends a long stretch of capital conservation by banks to return to reasonable levels of capital cushion.

What Does This Impact on the Banking Industry Mean for the US Economy?  Commercial real estate problems exacerbate rising unemployment rates and declining consumer spending. Approximately nine million jobs are generated or supported by commercial real estate including jobs in construction, architecture, interior design, engineering, building maintenance and security, landscaping, cleaning services, management, leasing, investment and mortgage lending, and accounting and legal services. Projects that are being stalled or cancelled and properties with vacancy issues are leading to layoffs. Lower commercial property values and rising defaults are causing erosion in retirement savings, as institutional investors, such as pension plans, suffer further losses. Decreasing values also reduce the amount of tax revenue and fees to state and local governments, which in turn impacts the amount of funding for public services such as education and law enforcement. Finally, problems in the commercial real estate market can further reduce confidence in the financial system and the economy as a whole. To make matters worse, the credit contraction that has resulted from the overexposure of financial institutions to commercial real estate loans, particularly for smaller regional and community banks, will result in a “negative feedback loop” that suppresses economic recovery and the return of capital to the commercial real estate market. The fewer loans that are available for businesses, particularly small businesses, will hamper employment growth, which could contribute to higher vacancy rates and further problems in the commercial real estate market.

A Solution. Any viable solution must be adept at balancing numerous issues. First, it must move a significant portion of the real estate assets off of the books of the banking institution, freeing the institution from asset management duties as well as exposure to further additional write downs. Second, it must provide the banking institution the opportunity to participate in the future rebound in those real estate assets’ value. Lastly, the overall solution must put the bank in a position to lend to qualified small businesses and worthy real estate assets. This lending activity not only stimulates economic activity and job growth, but also is the basis for bank earnings.

In multiple instances I have offered to a troubled bank the opportunity to sell a significant portion of their problem real estate holdings into a professionally managed real estate entity, while maintaining a back-end residual piece. Assets are purchased by a third party investor at the current Book Value, but the cash payment is limited to the Buyer’s determination of Fair Market Value. The difference is maintained as a residual interest the bank earns as the property and credit market move toward stability. The residual interest is not too big to impugn bank capital.

The entity is professionally managed by real estate executives with deep and broad experience in development, ownership and asset management. Assets are resolved over an extended period of time, with a focus on maximizing recovery. Over time, and under the auspices of professional real estate asset management the likelihood of par recovery is much greater. In the interim, banks are free of asset management headaches and additional accounting marks, which puts them in a position to start lending again.

If this were repeated enough, and the details transparent enough, the structure would create price discovery and lead to an understanding of true market value. Certainly we would experience an additional deterioration in values through this price discovery, but the industry would then have a foundation from which to begin the healing process and regain value.

Monday, April 26, 2010

FINANCING THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ACQUISITION

Introduction. As of this writing (April 2010) the anticipation of deal flow, more specifically, the opportunity to purchase mass quantities of distressed real estate mortgages, has yet to be realized. “Sourcing” the deal still seems to be the most valuable component of consummating a transaction. Of course, this reference to sourcing a deal needs to imply that it’s an opportunity with a realistic seller employing realistic expectations about valuations and pricing. If you are (pick one) good enough or lucky enough to source a deal you will immediately want to consider how to organize your capital for your most efficient acquisition execution. Some of your considerations should include:

Types of Financing. Depending on your access to “at-risk” equity capital and/or just your plain tolerance for risk, your note acquisition can use one or more of the following styles of capital financing:

Senior Debt. Private investors, traditional bank lenders, and a new breed of mortgage REIT’s are three categories of investors who have aggregated capital to provide acquisition financing in a senior secured position. Some common lending terms for this class of investor include:

50-60% LTC. The lender’s initial advance is typically sized off of a contracted purchase price in the range of 50 to 60% of such price. Considerations for going above or below the stated range would likely revolve around the current cash flow associated with the notes. A portfolio of land loans would be very difficult to borrow against for this reason.

Working Capital. A senior lender will be acutely concerned with the acquirer’s ability to fund out of pocket any working capital needs prior to the assets providing any substantial cash flow to the sponsor. Working capital needs would include salaries and overhead for team members and third party costs associated with the execution of individual asset management strategies, i.e. attorney’s fees for pursuing a foreclosure action.

Interest Only, Partially Accruing. Senior lenders typically structure debt service payments as interest only, since loan terms are usually three years of less. In some circumstances you may negotiate a portion of the interest payment to accrue and become due at the maturity of the loan. It’s vitally important to mirror the characteristics of the cash flows of the assets with those of the liability.

Points In & Out. In order to enhance their own yields some senior lenders will add discount points to the initial funding of the loan, and others will tack it on as loans payoff, otherwise known as exit fees. These fees should be added to the interest costs to determine the lender’s overall yield. An overall yield between 8 and 10% is pretty typical, depending upon the perceived risk of the assets, and should allow for a 200 to 250 basis point spread between an asset’s unleveraged yield and the cost of the senior debt, in terms of overall yield.

Current Coverage. A senior debt investor will ensure part of its safety margin with the current coverage ratio, or how much in excess of the lender’s debt service payments is the cash flow stream from the mortgage.

Expected Recovery. In addition to over-collateralizing itself from a value point of view, the senior lender will likely review the sponsors projected recovery. A loan worth $1 today may have a perceived higher payoff if the recovery strategy includes foreclosure and owning the fee simple interest in the property. However, a senior lender may perceive this “enhanced” future value as exactly the opposite, if the strategy entails far greater expenses and much greater time for realization. In other words, the riskier resolution strategy needs to convey a strong positive marginal return, otherwise your initial loan proceeds may get reduced.

Release Prices. In the context of buying multiple notes, all acting as collateral for your lender’s senior position, you may be required to distribute more than the pro rata amount of the senior debt when that specific note either pays off or is sold. This is analogous to a lot release schedule for a residential subdivision, which allows the lender to receive a full payoff prior to all the assets being sold.

Equity Joint Venture. Institutional real estate investors, including hedge funds, opportunity funds, special situations groups and others typically populate this type of financing. Occasionally you will find private investors included in this group, especially for one-off deals and small portfolios. Some considerations you must look at include:

Passive vs. Active. The style of your equity partner is extremely important to your decision. Namely, does your venture partner want to be a hands-on investor, dragging you and your team along for the ride, or is the investor small staffed and reliant upon you and your team to perform the necessary asset management duties and create the value? A simple look at the investor’s infrastructure will tell you which style they exhibit. Do they have 7 regional offices with 150 employees? Chances are you and your team will become additional employees.

Leveraged or Un-leveraged. Some institutional investors will want to leverage their own equity by using senior secured debt, and others won’t. The advantages to employing debt are obvious, but the reasons for not using leverage not so much. Typically, an institutional investor will not use leverage for the following reasons: 1) variability of note cash flows causing a concern of not meeting scheduled debt service; and 2) the desire to employ more investment dollars to reap more of the actual investment profits. Reason number 2 moves away from an IRR perspective and toward a whole dollar return philosophy. The old adage, “you can’t eat IRR”, applies.

Required Co-Invest – Something Meaningful. “Skin in the game”, conveys the meaning of the co-invest. Not all investors require a set percentage of their invested capital, especially when acquiring a large balance loan or a sizable portfolio. The key to this negotiated provision is that the investor realizes that the amount of co-invest is very meaningful – enough so to keep you awake at night and up early in the morning. A meaningful co-invest allows the investor to believe that all party’s interests have been aligned.

Sponsorship Fees. A key item for many investment sponsors is the amount and timing of fees associated with the management of that asset. Quite often these fees help support the sponsor’s infrastructure and acts as oxygen in the tank. Such fees can include the following:

Acquisition Fee. At the closing of the acquisition, the sponsor can earn a fee, equal to 0.5% to 1.5% of the total purchase price. Not all investors and lenders allow this fee. Others may allow the fee to act as the sponsors co-investment, while others will require the fee to be deferred to the back end of the investment, and paid out as a preferred distribution of profit.

Asset Management Fee. A monthly or quarterly fee usually equal to 1% of the total investment basis is paid to the sponsor for handling the off-site, day to day management of the assets. Depending upon the investor’s infrastructure and the perceived abilities of the sponsor’s team this fee may be shared between the sponsor and the investor.

Property Management Fee. If your exit strategy includes owning the fee simple interest in the collateral, the sponsor may choose to operate the property. If the sponsor is staffed with qualified property managers it may be eligible to receive a fee, equal to 3-5% of gross revenues, for the on-site, day to day management of the property.

Construction Management Fee. Part of the sponsor’s ownership responsibilities may include the oversight of property rehabilitation and/or tenant improvement construction. If the sponsor is staffed with qualified construction personnel it may be eligible to collect a fee equal to 3-5% of total construction costs.

Disposition Fee. At the time the venture sells the asset the sponsor may earn a fee based on a percentage of the sales price – typically in the range of 1-5%. This fee may be compensation for the sponsor’s effort to sell the asset directly or the oversight of brokerage team charged with selling.

Asset Management. In the business of buying and selling distressed real estate notes, the term asset management covers a wide variety of real estate skill sets. The range of skills spans from the administration of loan documents to foreclosure and receivership services, to marketing and leasing of properties to the strategy development of property disposition. In order for the sponsor to rightfully demand compensation for its asset management services it must be able to demonstrate its historical ability to effectively exercise these skills. A clear, concise and accurately presented capabilities brochures for the sponsor should be assembled ahead of time and presented to your capital partners and lenders early in the capital raising efforts.

Co-Invest Capital Partners. In a $50 Million portfolio acquisition a sponsor may face a required co-investment of $2.5 to $5.0 Million. For sponsor’s not possessing such financial capabilities it’s possible to reach out to a class of investors known as co-investment capital partners.

Institutional vs. Non-Institutional. These investors are very diverse in nature, with both private and institutional investors playing this high-leverage game. Equally diverse are the terms they are willing to invest under.

Deal Splits. Private investors may provide 100% of the required investment and in return may demand 50-70% of the sponsor’s profits. Institutional co-investment partners will typically provide a percentage of the required investment, 50-75%, and will demand repayment through a waterfall distribution schedule based on a calculated IRR.

Pursuit Costs. Prior to the consummation of an acquisition, the Sponsor must deal with the sticky issues involving pursuit costs: i.e. costs that must be incurred and currently paid in your efforts to get a deal under control. Among those costs are:

Initial Soft Deposits. Usually these are the responsibility of the sponsor. You may negotiate a sharing arrangement once a definitive agreement is in place between the sponsor and the capital party on the joint ownership of the asset.

Hard Money Deposits. Typically, hard money deposits are not made until there is a definitive agreement between sponsor and capital partner. Once that agreement is in place the sharing of hard money deposits is most often done on a prorata basis.

Underwriting/Third Party Costs. Again, these costs are typically the responsibility of the sponsor prior to definitive agreements, with the possibility of a sharing arrangement afterwards.

Closing Costs. Closing costs are a bit easier to deal with, since these expenses, can be and usually, are considered part of the cost of the deal and are financed out of the deal’s capital stack. All parties are much more at ease with them since they are part of a closed transaction. These costs include:

Title and Escrow, Legal and Accounting, Broker Fees. These costs are typically included in the deal’s capital stack, with the exception of either side paying their own legal costs in negotiating the agreement between sponsor and capital partner.

Underwriting Parameters. The foundation of your bid amount for the note, the lender’s financing and your capital partner agreement is the asset underwriting. Thus, it is critically important that your underwriting be done in a rigorous and robust fashion. This doesn’t necessarily mean overly conservative, since the market to buy loans today is rather competitive. It does mean that all assumptions must be well vetted and all elements of uncertainty taken into account.

Bottom-Up Real Estate Analysis. Note purchase analysis starts with a bottom-up real estate review. Since the value of the real estate is driving the value of the mortgage position, the review will be real estate centric. Beyond that, the analyst should look at how the specific collateral fits into the surrounding sub-market, in terms of rents, expenses, and occupancy. If the market changes how will the collateral change relative to where it is now and compared to the sub-market? Next, is how the sub-market fits into the city, state and region. Are these areas poised for growth in jobs, population and income? If so, how could those positive trends affect the collateral?

Mortgage Position Exit Strategy. The next relevant component of your underwriting is the expected exit strategy for the investment. The strategy should fit neatly with your bottom-up review. In a flat or mildly declining market, a discounted payoff to the borrower or a loan restructure and note sale to an investor may be a better play. In a soon to be appreciating market, the sponsor may get aggressive and plan to foreclose on the property and own the fee simple interests. Of course, any “loan to own” strategy must be fully vetted by legal counsel. What are the state laws concerning foreclosure, how likely is the borrower to fight the foreclosure, and what remedies do you have under the loan agreement?

Projected Property Cash Flow. The relevant information gained in the first two steps will guide you in building your property net operating income projections, as well as terminal values.

Variability of Projected Income. At this point, considerable care should be taken with regards to uncertainty. Running sensitivity analysis, testing your boundaries for downside, should help you assess your purchase price as well as assumed levels of senior debt.

Projected Exit Strategy Costs. If you do assume the “loan to own” strategy you will want to engage litigation counsel to provide you with estimates of time to achieve property ownership along with commensurate costs. Perhaps you can negotiate a fixed fee for delivering the deed in order to add an element of certainty to your projections.

Current Cash Flow to the Mortgage Position. Now you are ready to assess your current yield on your investment and the likelihood of profit. A few questions to be explored relate to income coverage ratios and the excess of terminal value over your investment basis.

Property Income Coverage. First, by how much does the net operating income from the property cover the scheduled mortgage payments due to the mortgage position? Second, by how much do the projected payments to the mortgage position exceed the scheduled payments to the senior acquisition lender you used to purchase the note? In both cases the degree of coverage will relate to safety. Any shortfalls experienced by the sponsor will either accrue to the senior principal position or will have to be serviced by the partnership. What does your partnership agreement say about debt service shortfalls? Was it planned for with a partnership reserve?

Projected Terminal Payment to the Mortgage Position. Determining this amount is very dependent upon the planned style of exit. A discounted payoff is the least risky strategy, but is likely to be the lowest payoff since a new loan, underwritten at today’s values and parameters, will be used to payoff the mortgage position. A foreclosure proceeding might be at the other end of the spectrum, with a note sale to a third party investor somewhere in the middle.

Sensitivity Model of Cash Flows. In distressed note purchases uncertainty is abound. At the property level rental rates, occupancies, operating expenses, and capitalization rates, can all demonstrate significant volatility. The stigma of distressed ownership of a property can have a highly detrimental impact on a tenant’s desire to continue inhabiting the property. If co-tenancy issues exist the problems can quickly multiply. At the loan document level a sponsor can incur an adverse ruling from a judge, and at the exit strategy level, take out loan underwriting can tighten, or a note buyer can fall out of escrow. Given the volatility of the environment, the sponsor needs to be well versed in sensitivity analysis, and understand what happens to its investment position if certain negative events happen. Developing a cash flow model that quickly assimilates the results of a negative event can greatly facilitate the investment committee talking through the strategy to mitigate these risks.

Distributions of Cash Flow. If all goes well you might even see some cash coming your way at the end of the investment. How that cash gets divided between lender, capital partner, co-invest partner and the sponsor is as varied as the imagination will allow. However, the following ideas should be kept in mind when negotiating all definitive agreements:

Senior Lender. In return for accepting a 9 to 10% overall return, the senior lender will demand priority of repayment on the vast majority of its distribution.

Current Interest. In some circumstances the lender will allow the sponsor to pay only a portion of the interest due on a monthly basis. This is usually driven by the nature and projected cash flow of the collateral. These payments always maintain priority.

Accrued Interest. When the projected cash flows from the collateral aren’t projected to cover the full interest payment, the lender may allow an unpaid portion to accrue and add to the principal amount to be paid off at exit. To the extent that the sponsor is earning monthly fees from the collateral’s income, the accrued interest becomes partially subordinated.

Exit Fee. To enhance its yield a senior lender may change the borrower a fee at the loan’s payoff. Usually these fees range from 1 to 3% of the loan balance. The shorter the term of the loan, the greater the yield enhancement. These fees maintain priority over distributions made to the equity.

Equity Joint Venture Partner. Once the senior lender is paid off the capital partner will want its share. Again, the methods employed for distribution can vary widely, and are only limited by imagination. In general, the capital partner will want to receive as much capital as possible prior to the sponsor receiving any. Typically, the capital partner will want to “back-end” the sponsor with distributions as much as possible, except with regards to the cash it actually invested. Usually cash is treated the same by both parties.

Return of Capital. The first level of distribution will be to pay a negotiated return on all capital invested, say somewhere between 8 and 12%. Once the return is paid, then the return of the capital is made.

IRR Hurdles. After invested capital is returned, the capital partner will likely propose a waterfall distribution that has the sponsor taking greater and greater percentages of the distributions as the capital partner earns profits over multiple IRR “hurdles”. 20% over a 10% IRR; 30% over a 15% IRR; 40% over a 25% IRR, etc., as an example. If the capital partner is a non-institutional investor you may be able to eliminate some or all of these hurdles and proceed with a straight, predetermined split.

Co-Investment Partner. In the above discussion the co-invest partner is part of the sponsorship entity. Whatever benefits the sponsor can negotiate with the capital partner, the co-investment partner will share.

Straight Splits vs. Waterfall Distributions. A co-investment partner can receive distributions in a myriad of ways. They can also negotiate preferred distributions with the sponsor. This is a high-risk investment and they should know well enough to demand commensurate returns. They will risk their capital with the sponsor because they believe in the sponsors business savvy and experience in dealing with defaulted mortgages.

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Acquiring Distressed Debt from Banks

Searching for Distressed Debt. The recent shutdown of the traditional real estate investment market has left all of us with a few new strategies to pursue, most of which involve the purchase of distressed debt. Strategies I have been pursuing include structured loan sales (Deutche Bank, PentAlpha), one off bids on DebtX and similar sites, as well as soliciting lenders known to have over-concentrations of real estate loans (not many that don’t).


When soliciting lenders it’s helpful to first do a bit of homework about the bank prior to making your call. First consider the environment all banks are operating in. Most banks aren’t capable of recognizing their assets at fair market value since doing so will drop their capital ratios below prescribed levels and open them to regulatory scrutiny and even foreclosure. So, two key questions you want to get a sense of answers on are: 1) is the bank likely to transact at a price that is somewhat near what I think the asset is worth?; and 2) does the bank hold the type of assets I want to buy?


Action Orders. A first consideration is whether the lender is operating under a Cease and Desist Order or Prompt Corrective Action Order from its regulatory body. Action orders can be researched here. If your target bank has been issued an Action Order you need to understand what capital ratio targets they have been instructed to hit. Most I have worked with require a troubled institution to achieve a Tier 1 Capital Ratio of 8%, instead of the adequately capitalized standards of 6%. Furhermore, it’s important for you to understand that if your bank is operating under an action order your bank will need regulatory approval to consummate any loan sale to you.


Figuring out what banks have on their books. Next, visit the FDIC website to gather your remaining data. There you will find a wealth of information regarding banks capital health, loan loss reserves (which will help you make an estimate of book value), and specific asset type concentrations.

For banks with FDIC insured deposits you will find quarterly “call reports,” which are published about 60 to 75 days after the end of each quarter. For thrift institutions with deposits insured by the FDIC you can do your research on the same website by searching for your particular thrift and clicking on its Thrift Financial Report (TFR).


Analyzing the data. In reviewing your data for your selected institution first analyze the institution’s capital health, or capital ratios. There are three specific ratios indicating a banks capital health. Please go to this link for a full and detailed report on bank capital ratios. These important ratios are:
• Tier 1 Leverage Capital Ratio

• Tier 1 Risk Based Capital Ratio

• Total Risk Based Capital Ratio

Call reports and TFR’s will usually list at least two of these three so there is no real need to calculate your own ratios. As a guideline, you want to see the bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio in excess of 6% if they are not operating under a regulatory directive, and over 8% if they are. Anything less than these thresholds will mean they have no room to negotiate asset sale prices below their book values. Next, look at the amount of the bank’s NPA’s or non-performing assets (REO assets plus loans 90 days past due) and divide this amount into total assets of the bank. In good times a healthy threshold number is around two percent. In this cycle 4% is workable ratio. Unfortunately I have seen way too many banks with ratios of 7, 10, 15 and 20%, which doesn’t bode well for the institution going forward, especially without significant extra capital somewhere in the bank.

Next, assess the type of NPA’s the bank is carrying. Since its NPA’s that are giving the bank the most problems they most likely will want to unload these assets versus performing assets. In a bank’s call report click on the link to REO Assets to see a categorical breakdown, which includes 1-4 Family, multi-family, construction, land and development. Next, click on the link to Non-Current Loans and Leases and search the same categorical information. Although this detail doesn’t tell you anything about specific credits it does tell you the type of assets you will have to choose from when you’re talking to the bank. If you are an income investor you may not want to deal with a lender that holds the majority of its NPA’s in 1-4 Family – or residential homes and land. So determine where the lenders greatest problems are and see if they match up with your asset specialty, size and location (which is more determined by where the bank is headquartered).

Next go to the Performance and Condition Ratios section to research the lenders loan loss reserve amounts and compare that amount to the total outstanding NPA’s portfolio. The percentage of loan loss reserves divided into total NPA’s will give you a sense of the average Book Value (as a percentage of original loan amount) for the non-performing assets (although this is not a perfect science since there could be additional general reserves above and beyond these specific reserves). If that average write down is determined to be 10% versus 30-50%, you may not want to waste your time working with this bank unless it has an enormous amount of capital on its books to sop up the hits to capital the bank will suffer when selling their NPA’s at FMV. Thus, a main analytical objective is to determine the distance between BV and FMV and compare that amount to the excess capital sitting on the banks books. Understanding this dynamic will tell you whether your time in soliciting the bank is worthwhile.

If you find that your target is worthy of your spending time to solicit be careful about how you approach them. Keep in mind you’re not the only investor making an effort to get inside a bank and rip their face off with your pricing (so that bank claims). Most banks have established special asset groups charged with answering requests for loan tapes. Some banks require executed Confidentiality Agreements so that lender/borrower relationships are not compromised.

If you get to point where the bank sends you a loan tape, be aware of what they are sending you. What loan classification (pass, pass watch, special mention, delinquent, non-accrual, REO) as well as the banks numerical ranking (1-6 in most cases). The higher the numerical ranking the more severe the distress. Go to the banks website and research their specific ranking system. You should find a list of such rankings and a description of each ranking in the website’s Investor Relations section.

In the best circumstance you can get the bank’s book value for each of the specific credits from a bank employee. In many cases the bank will be hesitant to provide book value since they believe that giving such information will compromise their ability to negotiate sale price with you. I typically find that concern is not well founded since I would never pay something as high as book value. Also, assess the number of loans and their average balances. An underwriting and execution strategy is very different for 150 credits with an average balance of $500,000 than for two credits of $30 million each. Available, experienced bodies are a key consideration. If you lack such bodies for a project shoot me a message.

My experience with banks and loan portfolios in this cycle is specific to 2009 and 2010. Prior to 2009 I was diligently pursuing my ground up development career in Texas and Florida. Those efforts seem 20 years ago now. In the 25+ banks that I have been on the inside of during this cycle I have seen a few very unnerving trends. First and foremost, book values are greatly in excess of market value. This is in part due to how a bank looks at a credit resolution versus a private, non-bank investor, and partly from the fact that an accurate reflection of true FMV would dig the bank’s grave and pull the dirt over their head. Also disturbing is the lack of quality loan files for each credit. Current market information and current operating statements are typically missing from the files of even healthy banks. Many times asset due diligence is substantially done in the field starting from scratch.

Once you have identified assets that you would like to pursue its time to assemble a concise yet effective Letter of Intent. I have worked with Patrick Valentino, at Corporate Counsel Group on these matters and he can be of service to you here, as well as with loan document review when its time to dig deeper.

According to Patrick, Letters of Intent can be used to protect the “refundablility” of any deposit required, and set the ground rules for the due diligence you will need to review. He also advises to stay away from protracted negotiations on reps and warranties in a Letters of Intent, preferring to keep that battle for the definitive purchase and sale agreement.

But before you submit your LOI I believe its best to perform some preliminary asset analysis. The two areas of focus are:


Quantitative Analysis. The end result of this look is to produce a set of cash flows likely to emanate from owning the credit, not necessarily the property. The first part is to look at the property operating statement, both revenues and expenses. Next is to compare the property NOI, and capitalized value, with the loans scheduled payments and maturity balloon payment. Unless the loan is in default you are capped as to the amount of periodic cash flow you can capture. Don’t forget to assess contract rents in light of market rents when calculating refinancing proceeds at the loans maturity. A consideration is that you will only receive the refinance proceeds the property can support at the time the loan matures, unless you want to spend the time and the money to fight a litigious borrower, especially if the property happens to reside in a state where the court systems are backed up two years, like Florida. In a planned foreclosure exit you need to factor in the cost of having a trustee appointed as well as attorney costs to fight the endless motions your borrowers counsel will throw at you, especially if he’s on contingency. Once you’re through BK court you will have to overcome the stigma the property likely gained from neglect during the court battle. Are you internally equipped or do you require outside asset management and property management to put the property back on the right path. Finally, you can begin to project property cash flows, an improving property and capital markets, tightening cap rates and a terminal sale returning a sufficient internal rate of return over an extended period of time.


Legal Analysis. Patrick Valentino is again a great resource here. I have worked with Patrick on outlining the due diligence needs on both one-off and pool loan acquisitions. There are several areas that need sound legal review, from negotiating the purchase and sale agreement to reviewing the loan documents and related file. Patrick highlights the importance of developing a comprehensive due diligence request list that gets delivered to the selling institution early in the process. Legal counsel should also develop a thorough due diligence review memo for the Buyer highlighting material areas of concern. A few key highlights include, on defaulted loans, i) has the lender properly noticed the borrower of the default, ii) what does the correspondence file between the lender and borrower tell you about the relationship and lender liability issues, and iii) are there inter-creditor issues that may stall your foreclosure action. And that’s just to name a few. You can view a thoughtful article authored by Patrick by clicking here.

In the next post I will cover financing your distressed debt acquisition and post-purchase asset management.

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Private Equity Investors and the Banking Industry

In 2009 the FDIC closed 140 federally insured banking institutions, with total assets of $170 Billion, and 20 more so far in 2010, with total assets of $14.44 Billion. To see the list of FDIC foreclosures click here.  Estimated losses to the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund, or DIF, in 2009 were approximately $52 Billion, and to date in 2010 another $4.3 Billion. On average, losses have run around 30% of a bank’s assets at the time of closure.

As of February 2010 the FDIC reported the DIF to be $20.9 Billion in the red, which represents -0.39% of insured deposits. As mandated by statute, the DIF must be maintained at +1.15% of deposits. As if this is not enough, the FDIC has established another 702 banks, with $403 Billion in assets, as lacking in sufficient capital and in need of being closed.

On February 11th 2010, the Congressional Oversight Panel, a 2008 government created agency to review the current state of the financial markets and the regulatory systems overseeing them, issued a report entitled: Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability. The report states that nearly half of the $1.4 Trillion of commercial real estate loans made over the last ten years, and maturing between 2011 and 2014, are currently underwater. If commercial property values have fallen roughly 50% from their peak, and these outstanding loans were made at 75% loan to value, on average, then we can interpolate the market value of the collateral to be in the neighborhood of $930 Billion.  If we assume the more stringent loan to value underwriting we are now faced with, say 65%, we can assume this debt to be worth around $607 Billion, indicating a loan loss approaching $800 Billion. So from the sounds of it, the FDIC may be underestimating it’s near term problems.


Where does it end and how much of a burden will this banking crisis be on us, the taxpayer?


At this point the FDIC is resolute in its claim that the taxpayers have not been burdened by any of the failures so far. Instead, says the FDIC, the banking industry has born the burden through the premiums they pay for their deposit insurance. Furthermore, in the mainstream media, the FDIC claims that the $45 Billion it received from the industry in December, from premium pre-payments will eradicate the negative balance of the DIF and restore it to long-term health. Is this just another accounting game our government plays with us un-informed taxpayer, or is the banking industry really paying its own tab? If they are paying their own tab will the bank’s prepaid premiums eventually not be enough to cover the full extent of the problem?


Since this version of the banking crisis began, the average expected loss to the DIF from a bank foreclosure has been in the range of 30% of total assets. If all 702 banks, with $403 Billion of assets, are closed that the FDIC says are in need of closing, the hit to the DIF would total approximately $121 Billion – 30% of the $403 Billion of assets. What am I missing?

The vast majority of these FDIC losses are generated by an agreement between the FDIC and a relatively healthy bank acquiring the failed institution. The FDIC’s Loss Share Agreements made their debut in the early 1990’s during the previous bank crisis. These agreements allow the FDIC to neatly merge a failed institution into a healthier one and therefore avoid a potentially larger loss through a forced liquidation of the assets on the open market.

Recently, the FDIC has been publicly criticized for unduly enriching those in ownership of the healthy, acquiring banks by providing lucrative loss share agreements as well as other types of asset support. The detractors claim that the FDIC could make better deals, having less negative impact on the DIF, with investors outside the banking industry.

The FDIC has also been publicly castigated for its recent stance on private equity firms attempting to make significant investments in banking institutions. In August 2009 the FDIC issued guidance on private equity investor purchases of failed banks.


The FDIC uses the following practices to restrict private equity:


• Limits on ownership and control;

• Restriction on information on opportunities;

• Greater capital requirements for private equity versus existing banks


Joseph Smith, the North Carolina commissioner of banks, has recently publicly stated that federal regulators should ease restrictions on private equity capital to help the recovery of commercial banks. Smith has warned that “keeping private equity away was causing more banks to fail. Many institutions are trapped in a death spiral, ordered to raise capital and then unable to do so. Regulatory incentives are aligned for an increase in failures and continued losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund.” What Smith is referring to here, and what I have been a witness to, is that eligible acquiring banks would rather wait to acquire a failing bank after foreclosure, and take advantage of the financial support the FDIC provides in such sales, than to purchase it in the open market.  The question is whether these banks would have the luxury of waiting if more private equity were allowed in to bid on the failed banks?  If so, we may be able to avert at least some of the losses we are experiencing today.

James Dunne, from investment banking powerhouse Sandler O'Neil, outlined his concerns over this guidance in a detailed letter addressed to the FDIC and dated August 4, 2009.  Click here to see the letter.


The Government's general arguments for blockading private equity include:


• Private equity’s receipt of favorable loans from the bank it owns;

• Private equity has a short-term ownership mentality focused on quick profits, and;

• Private equity’s disinterest in providing a financial backstop to the institution if it falters


Interestingly, some factions inside the banking industry agree with the FDIC’s position on private equity. The Independent Community Bankers of America, in a letter dated August 7, 2009 to the FDIC stated that it agreed with these higher standards for private equity.

What's potentially troublesome here is that such restrictions on private equity could eventually be unfair to taxpayers since taxpayers will likely have to support the lack capital in the DIF sometime in the near future. So if fresh capital coming into the banking system is so necessary why is private equity’s capital so bad?


Is it fair for the FDIC to place such strict guidelines on private equity investing in banks, especially at a time when the banking industry so desperately needs capital? Or, is private equity just a short-term solution with plenty of long-term problems that we will have to deal with later?